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1Abstract
Recent empirical work documents a decline in the U.S. equity pre-
mium and a decline in the standard deviation of real output growth. We
investigate the link between aggregate risk and the asset returns in a dy-
namic production based asset-pricing model. When calibrated to match
asset return moments, the model implies that the post-1984 reduction in
TFP shock volatility of 60 percent gives rise to a 40 percent decline in the
equity premium. Lower macroeconomic risk post-1984 can account for a
substantial fraction of the decline in the equity premium.
21 Introduction
Has increased U.S. macroeconomic stability contributed to a decline in the eq-
uity premium? Since the early 1980s, the standard deviation of U.S. real GDP
has been about half of what it was in the previous 40 years, suggesting a decline
in macroeconomic risk. A number of recent empirical studies have also docu-
mented a signi￿cant decline in the the U.S. equity premium over the last three
decades. While this decline might in part be due to a general reduction in ￿-
nancial market imperfections, it is plausible that some portion of the decline
can be attributed to a reduction in macroeconomic volatility. This paper uses
a calibrated DSGE model to quantify the relationship between macroeconomic
risk and asset returns. Simulations from the model suggest that a decline in ag-
gregate risk on the order of what has been observed in the postwar U.S. economy
would lead, ceteris paribus, to about a 40 percent reduction in the annualized
equity premium.
That the volatility of the aggregate economy has fallen since the early 1980s is
well-documented (McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Kim and Nelson (1999),
Kim et al. (2001), Stock and Watson (2003)). As reported in Stock and Watson
(2003), the volatility decline is manifested in a broad array of macroeconomic
variables, including output, consumption, and investment. The volatility decline
seems to be best characterized as a break point, rather than a long-term trend
decline. While the causes of the increased stability remain under investigation,
several studies suggest that "good luck," in the form of smaller shocks to total
factor productivity, account for a substantial fraction of the drop in the stan-
dard deviation of real GDP (Leduc and Sill (2004a), Arias et al. (2004). We
investigate the implications of this decline in aggregate risk for asset returns.
The decline in the equity premium is somewhat more di￿cult to verify.
As noted in Jagannathan et al. (2000), calculating the equity premium using
historical average di￿erences between stocks and bonds may not give good es-
timates in times when the premium is declining because that calculation does
not capture the price change that would accompany an unexpected decline in
the equity premium. Jagannathan et al. (2000) use an equity valuation model
based on Gordon (1962) to calculate changes in the equity premium over time.
Their analysis suggests the equity premium for the U.S. economy averaged 6.8
percentage points over the period 1926-1970 and about 1.5 percentage points, on
average, over the 1980s and 1990s. Several other studies, including Blanchard
(1993), Wadhwani (1999), and Siegel (1998), also ￿nd evidence for a drop in the
3equity premium.1 The studies do not, however, analyze reasons for the decline
in the equity premium.
Though the equity premium appears to have begun declining in the 1970s,
some 10 years or so prior to the sharp drop in the economy’s aggregate volatility,
that does not preclude a causal e￿ect from volatility to the equity premium.
Indeed, there is evidence for a signi￿cant decline in the equity premium post-
1980. Jagannathan et al. (2000) calculate an equity premium of 3.3 percent for
the 1970s, 0.94 percent for the 1980s, and 2.5 percent for the 1990s. While
declining macroeconomic risk may not be the only factor behind a drop in the
equity premium, it may well be a contributing factor.
The approach of this paper is to investigate the implications of a standard
RBC-asset-pricing model for the the e￿ect on asset returns of reductions in
aggregate risk. A model is calibrated to approximately match the pre-1980
equity premium and the pre-1984 volatility of total factor productivity shocks.
The model has a general process for exogenous TFP that allows for stochastic
variance. Consequently, it allows a numerical investigation of links between
the persistence of exogenous changes in TFP volatility and asset returns. In
addition, we examine stochastic steady-state behavior. That is, we quantify the
relationship between levels of TFP shock volatility and asset mean returns and
variances in an environment in which the variance of TFP shocks is not expected
to change over time. The model suggests that a decline in TFP shock volatility
on the order of what has been seen in the postwar data would be accompanied
by a drop in the annualized equity premium from a little over 5 percent to about
2 percent.
The model is able to approximately match the mean return on equities, the
risk-free rate, and the equity premium. A major failing of the model is that it
introduces substantial volatility in asset returns, particularly the risk-free rate
￿ much more so than what is observed in the data. The model implies a near
linear relationship between the volatility of the TFP shock and the volatility
of asset returns (though the slope is steeper for equities than for the risk-free
rate); it remains the case that even for the near halving of TFP shock volatility
since 1984, predicted volatility of asset returns remains too high.
A paper closely related to this one is Lettau et al. (2004) who investigate
how a decline in aggregate consumption risk a￿ects the equity premium. Their
model incorporate a two-state Markov switching process for consumption in
1See Jagannathan et al. (2000) for a review of this literature.
4a consumption-based asset pricing model with Epstein-Zin preferences. That
analysis suggests a robust correlation between low aggregate volatility and high
asset prices, and the estimated probability of being in a low volatility state
accounts for 30 to 60 percent of the log dividend-price ratio.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section lays out some facts
about the increased stability of the U.S. economy since 1984. We then discuss
the model and its calibration. Simulation results follow and a ￿nal section
concludes.
2 Postwar Volatility Patterns
A substantial body of empirical evidence indicates that the U.S. economy has
become more stable since 1984.2 Figure 1 plots hp-￿ltered log real GDP at a
quarterly frequency over the period 1947Q1 to 2005Q3. Prior to 1984, real GDP
moved in a band of about § 4 percent. Since 1984, the range of movement is
more on the order of § 2 percent. This apparent halving of volatility is visually
reinforced by a plot of the rolling 20-quarter standard deviation of hp-￿ltered
real GDP.
Figure 1: Postwar Real GDP














The sharpness of the decline in volatility is striking. Most research on the
decline concludes that the drop is best characterized as a one-time break, though
Blanchard and Simon (2001) argue that the decline can be thought of a gradual
process ￿ one that was slow and steady, interrupted by a temporary volatility
2See Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Stock and Watson
(2003), and Blanchard and Simon (2001).
5increase during the 1970s. What is clear from the studies though is that aggre-
gate volatility is generally lower over the post-1980 sample than in the pre-1980
postwar sample.
Potential causes of the drop in aggregate volatility remain an active area
of research.3 However, standard business-cycle models suggest that lower TFP
volatility accounts for a substantial portion of the real output volatility drop,
more so than say changes in monetary or ￿scal policy (see Leduc and Sill (2004b)
and Arias et al. (2004)). Figure 2 plots HP-￿ltered TFP and its rolling 20-
quarter-ahead standard deviation.4
Figure 2: Postwar TFP














The plots indicate that real GDP volatility and TFP volatility are closely
related, which suggests that there has been relatively less change in the process
describing the dynamics of aggregate hours during the postwar period.
The data on postwar real asset returns shows a less clear-cut pattern. Figure
3 plots the realized annual equity premium calculated using the Ibbotson (2003)
data on large company stock returns and Treasury bills. The large company
return series is based on the S&P500 composite index. The Treasury bill series
is derived from a one-bill portfolio containing the shortest term bill with not
less than one month to maturity. In￿ation is measured using the consumer price
index, not seasonally adjusted. The ￿gure suggests a potential decline in the
mean and standard deviation of the equity premium since the 1970s.
Figure 4 plots the real returns on equities and the Treasury bill series from
the Ibbotson dataset. Equity returns appear less volatile post-1970. Over the
3See Stock and Watson (2003) for a discussion of the literature
4The TFP series calculation follows Cooley and Prescott (1995). TFP growth is calculated
as as the quarterly change in log real GDP less 0.64 times the quarterly change in log aggregate
hours. The level was calculated as the sum of quarterly changes.
6postwar period, the real bill series is marked by a dramatic runup at the end
of the 1970s. On average, the post-1980 level of the real riskless rate appears
slightly higher than what it was in the 1950s and 1960s. From this graphical
evidence though, it is di￿cult to conclude that there has been a dramatic decline
in the average equity premium since the 1970s.


































Instead, our primary evidence on the decline in the equity premium comes
from Jagannathan et al. (2000). As mentioned above, their study uses a valu-
ation model based on Gordon (1962) that calculates the equity premium as a
function of the bond yield, the stock dividend yield, and the expected growth
rate in dividends. The model is applied to several alternative measures of the
aggregate U.S. stock portfolio and several alternative assumptions about stock
dividends and bond yields. T able 1 reproduces a subset of the numbers from
T able 4 of their paper.
All of their alternative formulations suggest a signi￿cant decline in the equity
premium over the last three decades. Over a longer time span, the authors
calculate an equity premium of slightly less than 6 percent over 1926-1999, and
about 4.5 percent over 1946-1999. Note that they measure the equity premium







































as the di￿erence between the stock yield and long-term bond yield, a measure
that is di￿erent from the expected return on equities in excess of the short-term
risk-free rate, as in Mehra and Prescott (1985).
T able 1: Jagannathan et al. (2000) U.S. Equity Premium
Period S&P1 CRSP2 BOG3
1950-1959 8.93 8.73 8.69
1960-1969 5.23 5.14 5.05
1970-1979 3.30 3.16 3.30
1980-1989 0.94 0.71 1.67
1990-1999 2.51 1.31 2.50
1 Standard & Poors Composite Index.
2 Value-weighted market index from
Center for Research in Security
Prices.
3 Federal Reserve Board of Governors
stocks held by U.S. residents.
83 Model
We modify a standard real business cycle model along the lines suggested in
Boldrin et al. (2001) and Jermann (1998) to give it a chance at matching the
equity premium without resorting to extreme risk aversion in preferences. These
modi￿cations amount to adding habit persistence in consumption and frictions
in the adjustment of capital and labor to shocks. We examine two models,
one with consumption and leisure in preferences and one with consumption
only. The introduction of variable labor supply is problematic for the model’s
ability to generate an equity premium. This happens because variable labor
a￿ords households another channel by which to smooth consumption. As a
consequence, there is less variability in the capital stock and not much variation
in equity prices. Uhlig (2004) highlights how labor market frictions of some sort
need to be introduced if the model is to have chance in matching the equity
premium. We follow Boldrin et al. (2001) and require that households choose
hours worked prior to the realization of the current-period productivity shock.
In addition to habits in preferences, and labor market frictions, the model
includes a capital adjustment cost, which induces variability in the capital gains
component of the return to equity. This basic model has been demonstrated
somewhat successful in matching the equity premium and business cycle mo-
ments for the U.S. economy over the postwar period.5 In order to more fully
analyze the relationship between aggregate stability and asset returns, we mod-
ify the model slightly by introducing an exogenous, time-varying TFP volatility
component.
Since the basic models are analyzed in Jermann (1998) and Boldrin et al.
(2000), we describe a basic version only brie￿y here. A representative household




¯t[ln(ct ¡ bct¡1) ¡ Áln(1 ¡ ht)]
In order to match the equity premium, it is important to introduce habit
persistent in preferences, though this by itself is not su￿cient to generate an
equity premium in the standard RBC framework. Essentially, this is because
the ￿exibility of hours worked and the linear capital accumulation process al-
low households to smooth consumption very e￿ectively and dramatically reduce
the variability of the return on equity (see Boldrin et al. (2000) for a full discus-
5Note that this version of the model is discussed in Boldrin et al. (2000).
9sion). In order to mitigate the hours worked channel on consumption smoothing,
we assume that current-period hours are chosen prior to the realization of the
current-period technology shock.
To generate enough variability in capital gains, we assume that capital ad-
justment is subject to a cost. Following Jermann (1998), the capital stock
evolves according to:




The function G(¢) is a convex adjustment cost function. We follow convention
in parameterizing this function so that G0(±) = 1 and G(±) = ±: Consequently,
in steady state, there is no cost of adjusting the capital stock. The adjustment












Our assumptions on G then imply ! = ±1¡vand · = v¡1
v ±. The capital
adjustment cost is added to the model in order to induce additional variation
in the price of capital, and hence equity returns. With this speci￿cation, it is






















Note that when v = 1, this expression reduces to the familiar one-period
return to capital: mpkt+1 + (1 ¡ ±); where mpkt is the marginal product of
capital at time t.
The economy’s resource constraint is given by:




where zt is an exogenous technology shock. Stochastic volatility is introduced
by assuming the technology shock follows the process:
zt = ½zzt¡1 + est"z
t (4)
st = (1 ¡ ½s)s + ½sst¡1 + ´"s
t (5)
10Thus, we allow the variance of the exogenous TFP shock to vary over time
with persistence governed by the parameter ½s. Note that in this speci￿cation, a
volatility shock does not directly a￿ect the level of zt but does so only indirectly
by scaling the e￿ect of "z
t. That is, impulse responses to a shock to "s
t, holding
"z
t constant, will be ￿at for all model variables.
4 Calibration and Solution
We begin by calibrating a baseline version of the model to see how well it does in
matching asset-return moments. As we will see below, this version of the model
generates a somewhat low return on equity. However, it is initially investigated
because it represents a commonly used calibration of the model’s parameters.
The baseline model sets the average volatility of the TFP shock to 0.0072, a
common number in the RBC literature. We discuss how ½s is calibrated below.
For the remainder of the model parameters, the calibrated values are standard
for this class of models and are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Baseline Parameterization
¯ ¿ ± ® µ v ½z ¾z
0.9945 0.90 0.025 0.36 2.18 -3.478 0.9219 0.0072
The choice of the habit parameter ¿ is the same as that estimated in Boldrin et al.
(2001) and somewhat higher than the value of 0.83 that Jermann (1998) needed
to match the equity premium. A higher value of ¿ is needed in models with vari-
able hours because variation in hours worked are used to smooth consumption.
The capital adjustment cost parameter v is the same as that used in Jermann
(1998), Boldrin et al. (2001), and Uhlig (2004).
The model is solved using a second-order perturbation method. That is,
a second-order Taylor series approximation is taken around the nonstochastic
steady state. The solution method is described in Swanson et al. (2005) and
is implemented using the perturbationAIM Mathematica code available on Eric
Swanson’s website: http://www.ericswanson.us/. The code allows for higher-
order approximations than 2nd, but we have not yet studied the implications of
2nd order versus higher order solutions for the ￿ndings of this paper.
114.1 TFP Process
We take two approaches in assessing the consequences for changes in TFP shock
volatility in the model. The ￿rst approach is to split the postwar sample into
pre-1983 and post-1983 subsamples and calculate the standard deviation of TFP
shocks in each subperiod. The model is then solved and simulated under each
standard deviation and asset return moments are calculated. This experiment
is one for which households were completely surprised by the increased stabil-
ity of the economy and do not expect a return to a higher volatility regime.
This approach provides no information about the transition from high volatility
episodes to low volatility epsiodes.
The second approach attempts to get at transition dynamics in a modest
way. We assume that TFP shock volatility follows an AR(1) process. The
empirical model is estimated using postwar data and the economic model is
solved and simulated using the estimated parameters.
To begin, a series for log TFP was generated using data on real GDP and
aggregate hours worked. This series was then detrended with a linear time trend.
An AR(1) process was estimated on the residuals from that regression to get an
estimate of the technology persistence parameter ½z = 0:9219. The calculated
standard deviation of the residual from this AR(1) regression is 0.0075 over the
period 1964:1-1983:4, and 0.0045 over 1984:1-2005:2. These estimates of the
standard deviation and of ½z are used in the steady-state analysis.
Under the stochastic volatility speci￿cation, the residual for the TFP process
residual is assumed to follow:
ut = zt ¡ 0:9219zt¡1
ut = ¾ exp(0:5 ¤ st)²t







There is a large extant literature on estimating the Gaussian ARSV model
(see Broto and Ruiz (2004) for a survey). We used the ssfpack routines writ-
ten for the Ox programming language to estimate the model using maximum
12likelihood.6
The stochastic volatility estimation program actually estimates transfor-
mations of the model variables in order to guarantee that certain desirable
properties hold. Table 3 gives the estimated parameters transformed to the
model- equivalent parameters, the underlying parameter estimates themselves,
and their standard errors. The estimated value of ½s, which governs the persis-
tence of the st process is fairly high. This is expected since, as already discussed,
there is substantial evidence for a drop in aggregate volatility post-1984 and such
a shift will show up as a high degree of persistence in volatility process spec￿-
ciation that is stationary. Note that all of the model parameters are estimated
with a fair degree of precision.
Table 3: Stochastic Volatility Estimates
½s ¾ ´
model variable equiv 0.84 0.0056 0.4904
underlying parameter 1.635 -5.1573 -.7126
standard deviation 0.709 0.2968 0.1319
Figure 5 plots the conditional mean of the scaled latent volatility process,
two-standard error con￿dence bands around the mean estimate, and the absolute
value of the TFP residual series. The estimated mean is a fairly slow-moving
process and is clearly higher, on average, in pre-1984 data than the post-1984
data. The estimated conditional mean drops from about 0.01 in late 1980 to
about 0.005 in 1984.
Note that the estimated volatility mean shows a strong decline beginning
in 1980Q4 and extending, roughly, through 1984. This timing is somewhat
earlier than what is suggested by the break- point analysis conducted in the
U.S. volatility literature. We will discuss the implications of volatility shock
persistence on the equity premium below. In general though the evidence from
this analysis suggests that, for the U.S. economy, high-frequency variation in
TFP shock volatility is unlikely to be of ￿rst-order importance in determining
the relationship between volatility changes and asset returns.
6The GARSV estimation program was written by Siem Jan Koopman, and is available at
http://sta￿.feweb.vu.nl/koopman/sv.
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5 Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock
To get insight into the workings of the basic model, we start by analyzing a set
of impulse responses to a technology shock in the model with variable hours. We
￿rst look at how the economy responds to a temporary one-standard-deviation
shock to TFP assuming no cost of adjusting the capital stock (but with habit
persistence and pre-determined hours worked). The impulse responses for this
version of the model, under the baseline calibration in Table 2 are shown in
Figure 6.
The model has a hump-shaped response of consumption to the positive tech-
nology shock. Hours worked rise in response to greater productive opportunities
today as substitution e￿ects dominate income e￿ects. Output jumps, but not as
much as in the second period after the shock because households are not allowed
to adjust hours worked immediately in response to the shock. The risk-free rate
initially rises, and then declines as the growth rate of consumption moderates.
Note that equity returns rise, but by only slightly more than the rise in the risk-
free rate. Indeed, the expost equity premium rises only 0.025 percentage points
in response to the TFP shock. Clearly, a speci￿cation that does not include
a mechanism to induce variability in the return to capital will not be able to
generate a sizeable equity premium. In this model, the supply curve for capital
14Figure 6: Responses to Positive Technology, No Capital Adjustment Cost













































is perfectly elastic. As a result, the price of capital is constant and there is no
variation in capital gains. The marginal product of capital is the only source
of variation in equity returns, and under standard calibrations, variation in the
marginal product of capital are small.
Adding capital adjustment costs makes a striking di￿erence to the magnitude
of asset return responses to a technology shock. The impulse responses when
capital is costly to adjust are reported in Figure 7.
Note ￿rst that with capital adjustment costs, hours worked now respond
negatively to the exogenous increase in productivity.7 This happens because
the adjustment cost acts like a tax on labor income. As noted in Boldrin et al.
(2001) this tax causes the income e￿ect of the technology shock to dominate
the substitution e￿ect ￿ leading to a drop in labor supply. Note as well that
now the risk-free rate responds negatively to the positive technology shock, and
that equity returns show a strong positive response. Consequently, there is
now a strong positive response of the equity premium to a positive technology
7Recent research suggests this may be a feature of the data but our model does not explain
the positive comovement of hours, consumption, investment, and output. See, e.g., Basu et al.
(1999), Shea (1998), Gali (1999) and Francis and Ramey (2001).
15Figure 7: Responses to Positive Technology, with Capital Adjustment Cost










































surprise. However, there is relatively little persistence in the response of the
equity premium to a technology shock.
5.1 Volatility Shocks
What is the dynamic response of the economy to a volatility shock? The volatil-
ity process speci￿cation implies that a volatility shock in and of itself has no
consequence for the dynamic path of the economy. It is only the interaction
of volatility and shocks to TFP that in￿uences model dynamics. Consequently,
we consider how the ex post equity premium responds to a TFP shock both
with and without a concurrent volatility shock. Impulse responses to a positive
one standard deviation technology shock and a one standard deviation volatility
shock are plotted in ￿gure 8.
The upper right left plot is the response of volatility (st) to a one-standard
deviation shock. The upper right panel plots the equity premium response to
simultaneous, positive, one-standard-deviation shocks to TFP (zt) and volatility.
The lower left panel plots the response of the equity premium to a one-standard-
devation shock to TFP, with no concurrent volatility shock. The lower right
16Figure 8: Ex Post Equity Premium Impulse Response
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panel is the relative response of the equity premium to the two cases. Ie, it is
the upper right impulse divided by the lower left impulse.
The ￿gure indicates that persistent volatility shocks do not add much to the
shape of the dynamic path for the model’s equity premium. That is, comparing
the cases with and without a volatility shock, the largest di￿erence is in the ￿rst
period after the shocks hit the economy, when the absence of a volatity shock
leads to lower equity premium. For the most part though, the volatility shock
increases the height of the impulse response by a factor of about 1.5, which is
fairly sizeable. Note that the proportionality factor is not declining over the life
of the impulse response.
It would appear then that the stochastic volatility component of the model
17has its e￿ect mainly on the level of the equity premium rather than its dynamic
response to a technology shock. How does the persistence of shocks to TFP
volatility a￿ect the equity premium in the baseline model? Figure 9 plots the
mean equity premium as a function of the persistence of the volatility process.
The ￿gure was generated by assuming the baseline calibration, varying ½s from
0.5 to 0.99, and simulating the model for 10,000 periods for each value of ½s.
The ￿rst 1000 simulation periods are dropped and a mean annualized equity
premium was calculated from the remaining 9,000 observations.
Figure 9: The E￿ect of Volatility Persistence: Baseline Calibration











Figure 9 shows that the calculated equity premium rises with the persistence
of volatility shocks. However, over a wide range of persistence parameters, there
is relatively little change in the equity premium. It is only when the volatility
process has persistence above 0.9 that we see a dramatic e￿ect on the mean
premium. Under the baseline calibration, the mean equity premium is on the
order of 3 percent. This value is lower than common target values for the
equity premium. F or example, using data from Ibbotson Associates, the equity
premium for large stocks over T reasury bills averaged about 8 percent over the
period 1926-1929, and about 5 percent over the period 1964-2002, which sample
period matches up with our calculated TFP series. F or the period 1964-2002,
real stock returns averaged 6.7 percent and the real return on T reasury bills
averaged about 1.5 percent calculated using the Ibbotson dataset.
Some modi￿cation must be made to the baseline calibration if the model is
to match the pre-1984 equity premium. In the next section we shut down the
18stochastic variance feature of the model and look at standard speci￿cations for
the technology shock that have constant variance. To generate a higher mean
return on equity, we increase the adjustment cost parameter v slightly to -4.75,
from the baseline value of -3.478. This reparameterized version of the model
gives a mean equity return of about 7 percent and a mean riskless return of
about 1.5 percent when the standard deviation of TFP shocks is set to 0.0072,
a common value for standard deviation used in the RBC literature.
6 Aggregate Volatility and Asset Returns
Increasing the mean variance of the TFP shock process and raising the adjust-
ment cost on capital allows the model to approximately match the historical
equity premium. We now turn to what the model implies about the relation-
ship between aggregate risk and asset returns. To do so, we simulate the model
under a wide range of parameterizations for the volatility of TFP shocks. For a
given standard deviation of the TFP shock, the model is solved and simulated
for 10,000 periods. The ￿rst 1000 observations are dropped, and mean returns
are calculated for equities and the riskless asset.
As a robustness check on the ￿ndings, we also conduct the same simulation
excercise on a model that removes leisure from household preferences (but re-
tains habit persistence and capital adjustment costs. Thus the model is that of
Jermann (1998)). In order to facilitate comparison across models, we adjusted
the discount factor ¯ for the model without hours so that it matched a mean
risk-free rate of about 1.5 percent when the standard deviation of the technology
shock is set at 0.0075. The simulation results for the two model speci￿cations
are graphed in Figure 10.
There is a modest e￿ect of aggregate risk on the risk-free rate, and much
larger e￿ect on the risky rate. The estimated value of TFP shock standard devi-
ation for the pre-1984 period is 0.0075. For the post-1984 period, the estimated
standard deviation of the TFP shock is 0.0045.
The steady-state simulations suggest that a drop in aggregate risk on the
order of what has been observed for the postwar U.S. economy leads to a sizeable
e￿ect on mean equity returns and the equity premium. Varying aggregate risk
has a relatively modest e￿ect on the level of the risk-free rate.
The average return on equity falls from about 7 percent when TFP shock
volatility is at its post-1984 estimate to a bit under 4 percent when TFP shock
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volatility is at its pre-1984 estimate. With only a slight increase in the risk-
free rate, the equity premium falls by about 3 percentage points to roughly 2
percent. Thus, we get about a 40 percent reduction in the equity premium
entirely from a 60 percent reduction in macroeconomic risk, as measured by the
standard deviation of TFP shocks.
We might expect then, that to the extent that the U.S. economy remains
in its current low-volatility regime, the equity premium will remain low by his-
torical standards. Our implications of lower macroeconomic risk for the eq-
uity premium leave room for the role of reduced market imperfections in ac-
counting for the decline. The model does not predict as large a decline as say
Jagannathan et al. (2000) calculate in their model. In addition, the 1984 timing
of the aggregate break does not match up with the start of the decline in the
equity premium, which may have begun sometime in the 1960s.
While the model gives reasonable predictions on mean returns and the equity
premium, it does not do well in matching the volatility of risky and riskless
returns. Figure 11 plots return volatility against TFP shock volatility. The
methodology for generating this graph is the same as in Figure 10. For the pre-
1984 data, the model predicts quarterly equity return volatility on the order
of 16 percent, and riskless return volatility on the order of 10 percent. In the
data, quarterly real stock return standard deviation is about 6 percent and
riskless rate standard deviation is about 0.6 percent. The model does predict
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a signi￿cant decline in risky and riskless return volatility when aggregate risk
declines. For the post-1984 TFP shock volatility estimate, the model predicts an
equity return standard deviation of about 9 percent and riskless return standard
deviation of about 6 percent. So, the model gets closer on equity return volatility
but continues to miss badly on riskless return volatility. However, as noted in
Boldrin et al. (2001) this may not necessarily be a fundamental shortcoming of
this class of models. Campbell and Chochrane (1999) and Abel (1999) present
models with habit persistence that generate more reasonable results for the
volatility of the risk-free rate.
7 Conclusion
Recent empirical work documents a dramatic decline in the aggregate volatility
of the U.S. economy and a sharp decline in the equity premium. We use a dy-
namic equilibrium model to measure the implied decline in the equity premium
from a reduction in macroeconomic risk on the order of what has occurred for
the postwar economy. The model implies that lower macroeconomic risk can
account for a substantial fraction of the decline in mean stock returns and the
equity premium.
While the model does reasonably well in matching ￿rst moments of asset
returns, it has di￿culties matching second moments, especially of the real risk-
21free rate. The model overpredicts riskless rate volatility in part because a high
value of the parameter that governs habit persistence is needed to generate a
sizeable equity premium. In models of this class, if one is willing to increase
risk-aversion, less habit persistence is required to match mean asset returns,
which simultaneously leads to lower volatility of the risk-free rate. However,
Boldrin et al. (2001) point out that higher risk aversion also has adverse impli-
cations for employment dynamics in such models.
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